The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 42 | Number 3

Article 4

August 1975

The Good Samaritan Ideal and Beneficent
Euthanasia: Conflicting Views of Mercy
Arthur J. Dyck

Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Dyck, Arthur J. (1975) "The Good Samaritan Ideal and Beneficent Euthanasia: Conflicting Views of Mercy," The Linacre Quarterly:
Vol. 42: No. 3, Article 4.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol42/iss3/4

The Good Samaritan Ideal and Beneficent
Euthanasia: Conflicting Views of Mercy
Arthur J. Dyck

The debate over mercy killing
involves quite different understandings of what it means to
show mercy. Indeed, Webster's
N ew World Dictionary attaches
at least two quite different meanings to the word mercy. On the
one hand, mercy refers to a constraint against acting in certain
ways. Mercy defined in this way
is "a refraining from harming or
punishing offenders, enemies, persons in one's power, etc.'" To kill
someone is a commonly recognized form of harm, so that refraining from killing someone,

particularly someone in one's
power, can be seen as being merciful. The association between
"mercy" and "failing to kill or be
killed" is rendered explicit when
the dictionary fur the r defines
mercy as "a fortunate thing; thing
to be grateful for; blessing (a
mercy he wasn't killed) ." 2
On the other hand, the dictionary defines mercy in still another
way, as "a disposition to forgive,
pity, or be kind" and as "kind or
compassionate treatment; relief
of suffering." '; What would constitute relief of suffering is not
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specified. The way is opened to
consider killing as an act of mercy
if, under certain circumstances, it
is seen as the only or best way to
relieve suffering. Thus one has
come to speak of killing in certain
instances as mercy killing.
Increasingly the word " euthanasia" is being used as a synonym for mercy kiHing. Originally
the Greek word euthanasia meant
painless, happy death. This meaning still appears as one definition
of the term. However, a second
meaning is added which specifies
that euthanasia is an "act or
method of causing death painlessly, so as to end suffering: advocated by some as a way to deal
with persons dying of incurable,
painful diseases."4 In the light of
current usage and for purposes of
this essay, I am using " mercy
killing" and "euthanasia" as synonyms for "the deliberate inducement of a quick, painless death."
The problem I wish to pose in
this essay is whether or not the
desire and obligation to be merciful commits us to a policy of euthanasia. Some have claimed that
there is a moral obligation to be
merciful or beneficent and that
beneficent euthanasia is, therefore, not only morally justifiable
but morally obligatory. This is a
claim that deserves the careful
scrutiny of any morally conscientious person. After evaluating certain- arguments for beneficent
euth~nasia, I will t hen co~sider
the possibility of an alternative
notion of how an obligation to be
merciful can be fulfilled in those
situations where some would arAugust, 1975

gue that mercy killing is morally
justified or even obligatory.
The Ethic of Beneficent
Euthanasia
One of the most compelling
cases for beneficent euthanasia
has been offered by Marvin Kohl. '
According to Kohl, all of us have
a prima facie obligation to act
kindly. For the purposes of indicating when euthanasia would be
an act of kindness, he specifies the
following sense in which an act
can be described as kind:
an act is kind if it (a) is intended to be helpful ; (b) is done so
that, if there be a ny expectation of
receiving remuneration (or the
like) , the individual would nonetheless act even if it became apparent
that there was little chance of his
expectation being realized ; a nd (c)
results in beneficial treatment for
the intended recipient. The Boy or
Girl Scout helping an elderly man
or woman cross the street, or the
proverbial Good S a maritan. are
paradi gm cases of kindness. 6

From this definition of kindness, Kohl argues that
the necessary, a nd perhaps sufficient, conditions for beneficent euthanasia are that the act must
involve a painless inducement to a
quick death; that the act must result in beneficial treatment for the
intended recipient; a nd that, aside
from the desire to help the recipient, no other conside rations are
relevant [a combination of conditions (a) and (b) F

To further clarify precisely what
he means by beneficent euthanasia, Kohl offers th~ rea de; two
paradigm cases. The first case involves patients: (1) suffering
from an irremediable condition
like cancer (disseminated car-
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cinoma metastasis); (2) with severe pain; (3) clearly dying as a
result of their condition; (4) voluntarily in favor of some means
of "easy death; " and (5) that
apart from the desire to help such
patients, no other circumstances
are relevant. Kohl cites another
type of case as a paradigm: children who are severely handicapped, for whom death is not
imminent and who are not suffering pain. These t wo types of cases
are quite different in Kohl's mind
except in two important respects :
both involve serious and irremediable physical conditions and
a rouse in others a wish to help.
Kohl argues that in both types of
circumstances, in d u c e d death
would probably be considered an
act of kindness by most persons.
Kohl underlines the importance of
this claim because
if true it means that considerations
of free choice , the imminence of
death, a nd/ or the ex istence of pain
are not a lways relevant, a t least not
to judgments of kindness. K

With these paradigms in mind
and on the assumption that societies and their individual members have a prima fa cie obligation
to treat one another kindly, Kohl
infers quite logically that beneficent euthanasia, because it is a
species of kindness, is a prima
facie obligation. This conclusion
seems obvious to Kohl but he realizes that it is not obvious to
everyone, given certain objections
that have been raised against euthanasia. Kohl, therefore, feels
constrained to take up three such
objections and offer what he takes
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to be refutations of them:
(1) Against "edge of the
wedge" claims, he argues
that a policy of beneficent
euthanasia will result in
mllllmlzmg suffering and
maximizing kindly treatment;
(2 ) Against claims t hat homicide is intrinsically unjust,
he argues that beneficent
euthanasia satisfies a fundamental need for human
dignity; and
(3) Against those who argue
that we are not obligated
to kill, even out of kindness, he argues that failure
to give help in the form of
beneficent euthanasia is a
fa ilure to live up to the
Good Samaritan ideal.
(1) The "Wedge" Argument
Kohl interprets the "wedge" as
claiming that if beneficent euthanasia is morally justified, then
euthanasia that cannot be considered to be beneficent will come
to be practiced and justified. H e
sees "wedge" arguments as based
upon two assumptions, first that
all theories of euthanasia ultimately rest upon a principle of
utility, and second, that all
theories of utility are the same as
those held by the Nazis, the implication being that great cruelties rather than kindness will result from such theories.
Kohl disassociates himself from
any view that would advocate euthanasia for economic purposes.
He distinguishes utility from
beneficence. The duty of beneLinacre Quarterly

ficence is in his view the duty to
minimize suffering and to maximize kindly treatment. If there is
a "slippery slide" that results
from policies of beneficent euthanasia, it will be in the direction of
minimizing suffering and maximizing kindly treatment. Secondly, he distinguishes between the
kindest way of doing X and the
kindest way of treating a human
being as a human being. Beneficent euthanasia has for its objective not merely death with dignity, but living and dying with
dignity. Again the goal is to minimize suffering and to maximize
kindness.
In dealing with the "wedge"
argument, Kohl has not yet confronted it in its most powerful
form. A "wedge" argument does
not have to predict that certain
practices will follow from another.
A "wedge" argument is concerned
with the form or logic of moral
justifications.
Consider, for example, Kohl's
point that it is morally justifiable
and obligatory to practice beneficent euthanasia in some cases
where the person killed does not
choose death, is not dying, and is
not in pain. It is very difficult to
see why this would not justify
involuntary euthanasia. Suppose,
however, that Kohl is not bothered by this, as indeed he should
not be. The next question that
arises is that of procuring agreement as to the narrowness or
broadness of the categories of persons to be appropriate candidates
for mercy killing. Presumably the
criterion that would for Kohl keep
August, 1975

the category of cases narrowly
defined is that of preserving the
dignity of human beings. A child
born without limbs, sight, hearing, or a functioning cerebral cortex, although not in pain and not
dying, is for Kohl lacking in dignity or, in any event, will be
treated with dignity when painlessly put to death.
Some people have argued that
mongoloids, however happy and
however in some instances educable, are also lacking in dignity so
that their lives need not always
be sustained even when they
could be. What the "wedge" argument is saying is that there is
no logical or easily agreed upon
reason why the range of cases
should be restricted to Kohl's
paradigm or why it would not be
beneficial to extend the range
even beyond the retarded. For
example, we have instances where
quadriplegics who are fully conscious and rational are not asked
whether they wish to live or die
but are drugged and deprived of
life support so that they die. The
justification for this is logically
the same as the justification for
beneficent euthanasia in the case
of the severely retarded. The
physicians consider the life of a
quadriplegic to be undignified or
one of suffering or, at least, a life
not worth living. These physicians
certainly see themselves as acting
out of kindness.
The point of the "wedge" argument is very simple. Killing is
generally wrong. It should be kept
to as narrow a range of exceptions
179

as possible. The argument for
beneficent euthanasia, unlike arguments for killing in self defense,
applies logically to a wide range
of cases and the reasons for keeping the range of cases narrow are
not reasons on which people will
easily agree. In short, arguments
for beneficent euthanasia apply
logically to either a narrow or a
wide range of cases. Whether
beneficent euthanasia will be applied to a narrow range of cases
does not depend simply on how
kind a society is. I t will depend
also on the various notions that
are held as to what constitutes a
dignified or meaningful human
life. About this there will be widespread differences of opinion,
many of them based on implicit
or explicit theological assumptions.
Furthermore, the " wedge" argument w 0 u I d warn against
adopting a principle of minimizing
suffering and maximizing kindness. It sounds right but its logical implications go far beyond the
intentions of a Marvin Kohl. If
minimizing suffering is linked
with killing, we have the unfortunate implication that killing is a
quicker, more painless way to alleviate suffering than the provision of companionship for the
lonely and the long-term care for
those who are either dying or recuperating from long-term illriesses. '
Clearly, Kohl does not want to
minimize suffering by resort to
killing but only by resort to killing out of kindness. The question
180

remains, then, whether killing out
of kindness can be maximized
without involving a much wider
range of cases than Kohl envisages. I shall come back to the
question about whether mercy
killing restricted to a narrow
range of cases in accord with
Kohl's paradigms is something
that should be justified despite
the very telling difficulties raised
by the "edge of the wedge" argument.
(2) Euthanasia as Unjust
Kohl argues that beneficent euthanasia is consistent with justice
because it meets a basic need for
dignity and self-respect. Such
dignity is clearly exercised when
people ask for a quick and painless death in circumstances where
they see only pain and suffering
as their lot. But Kohl does not
want to restrict euthanasia to instances where consent can be obtained. Sometimes, he contends,
neither justice nor dignity is
served when the misery of an individual increases and consent is
not possible.
Here again we see that there
are instances in which Kohl would
claim the inducement of a painless, quick death confers dignity
where otherwise there is none. As
we noted previously, it is difficult
to know how wide a range of cases
should be included among those
w:here dignity is obtained through
a non-voluntarily induced, painless death. Those who induce this
death will no doubt have varying
notions as to what kind of misery
and how much of it renders a life
Linacre Quarterly

undignified. This is precisely what
the "wedge" argument is worrying about. If euthanasia is practiced on others by someone like
Kohl, it will be used as a last resort. If, however, there is a general policy of considering beneficent euthanasia a moral obligation and hence also existing laws
that permit people to live up to
their obligations, the practices
may be quite different from those
that Kohl would envisage and
sanction. This would not be true
because kill i n g is contagious
(Kohl has quite properly objected
to that argument) but because
the notion of dignity is open to a
very wide range of meanings. It is
also true as we noted previously
that agreement as to what confers
dignity is difficult to obtain. In
any event, those who advocate
beneficent e u t han a s i a should
clearly specify what they mean by
dignity and how they justify their
invocation of that term.
(3) The Obligation to Avoid
Killing
Kohl recognizes that there are
some who can argue that one is
not obligated to help the suffering in every way possible, particularly if such help entails killing. On Kohl's view, an important
assumption in that argument is
that cruelty is to be avoided. Kohl
contends that beneficent euthanasia also seeks to avoid cruelty.
The difference between opponents
and proponents of euthanasia
here is over the meaning of what
constitutes cruelty and whether
or no t avoidance of cruelty IS
August, 1975

morally sufficent. Kohl argues
that those who oppose euthanasia
on grounds that it is cruel interpret cruelty in a narrow sense to
mean deliberately causing unnecessary pain or harm. They do
not use the broader sense of the
term cruelty which refers to deliberately causing or allowing
needless pain or harm. As a consequence, Kohl argues, these opponents of euthanasia are too
prone to tolerate or excuse human misery.
Kohl calls this desire to avoid
cruelty a "taboo" morality. It
tells us what not to do but not
what to do. A society that avoids
cruelty is admittedly better than
one that does not. However, this
"taboo" morality is contrary to
the ideal of the Good Samaritan
who, unlike those who walk past
the injured or the sick, seeks to
help. Aversion to cruelty may not
harm anyone, but it is not a sufficient principle of action if it does
not include the obligation to help
and be beneficent to others.
These arguments by Kohl are
rat her uncharacteristic of his
usual fa i r n e s s to opponents.
Those who oppose euthanasia because it is an act of killing share
with the Good Samaritan the concern to care for somebody who is
or may be dying. That is surely
one of the major reasons for opposing euthanasia, namely to care
for people who are still alive and
to help them to make the most of
life, relieving pain and suffering
as much as is possible without
purposely killing them. Kohl is
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assuming that the Good Samaritan ideal of practicing mercy
views what is merciful in exactly
the same way as he does in advocating beneficent euthanasia. Presumably, if the dying man on the
road to Jericho had asked the
Good Samaritan to help him by
making his death painless and
quick, the Good Samaritan would
have been obligated to do so, depending upon whether he felt that
the injured man was indeed dying.
We see then how we have come
about full circle. In effect, Kohl
is taking the position that only
proponents of euthanasia wish
postively to exercise mercy whereas opponents of euthanasia are
simply trying to avoid doing
something wrong and are so bent
on it that they are not willing or
able to be merciful. Whether or
not one favors euthanasia and
whether or not it is considered an
obligation would seem, then, to
depend on one's notion of what is
merciful. The very understanding
of a powerful paradigm case of
mercy, the Good Samaritan ideal,
is in dispute. Does the Good Samaritan ideal expect mercy of us
in the form of mercy killing as
Kohl argues? I think not. Within
the space allotted, it is not possible to do more than sketch some
of the main contours of a policy
that accepts the Good Samaritan
ideal of mercy as a moral obligation but rejects beneficent euthanasia or mercy killing as a
form of it.
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The Good Samaritan Ideal:
An Ethic of Benemortasia
Because euthanasia no longer
functions as a merely descriptive
term for a happy or good death, it
is necessary to invent some term
for this purpose. I have chosen
the word "benemortasia" which is
derived from two familiar Latin
words, bene (good) and mors
(death). What bene in benemortasia means depends upon the
ethical framework that one adopts
in order to interpret what it is to
experience a good death or at
least what would be the most
morally responsible way to behave in the face of death, either
one's own or that of others. The
ethic of benemortasia being suggested in this essay is one such
ethical framework built upon a
conception of mercy that suggests
policy alternatives to beneficent
euthanasia.
The ethic of benemortasia I
wish to commend to the reader
recognizes mercy or kindness as
a moral obligation. Mercy is understood in at least two ways:
First, it is merciful not to kill;
secondly, it is merciful to provide
care for the dying and the irremediably handicapped.
The injunction not to kill is
part of a total effort to prevent
the destruction of human beings
and human communities. It is a
universal prohibition in the sense
that no society can be indifferent
about the taking of human life.
Any act, insofar as it is an act of
taking a human life, is wrong,
that is to say, taking a human life
Linacre Quarterly

is a wrong-making characteristic
of actions. 9
Within the history of the West,
the necessity for a prohibition
against killing was recognized under intensely dramatic circumstances. A band of slaves finds
itself in the midst of a desert,
having escaped from oppression.
These slaves must pull together
or perish together under the most
harsh conditions. As the very
basis of their community, these
slaves, now free, chose to unite
themselves around certain ,definite constraints, including the
pledge not to kill one another.
The acknowledged leader of this
community was characterized as
one who heeds the cries of the
oppressed and delivers from oppression. Those who have been ·
liberated from their bondage now
pledge themselves not to injure
one another in the form of stealing, bearing false witness, infidelity, or killing. T his newly
formed community bound together by what has come to be
known as the Mosaic Covenant
placed itself under the judgment
of the most powerful force for
justice that they could imagine,
so strong was the devotion to justice and to the mercy that delivers the powerless from the powerful.
In the story of the Good Samaritan, a lawyer allegedly confronted Jesus with a question,
namely, "what must I do to inherit eternal life?" In other words,
what must I do if I am to attain a
complete life, one in which I realize myself to the utmost? Jesus
August, 1975

inquired whether he knew the law
and the lawyer said he did. To
show that he did, the lawyer provided Jesus with a summary of
the law well known to Jesus at
that time: "You shall love the
Lord your God with all your
heart and all your might, and
your neighbor as yourself." The
lawyer did not recite the whole
Mosaic Covenant, but there is no
question that the summary that
he gave included and was meant
to include the notion that one
should not kill one's neighbors.
(The sentences in quotation
marks in this and the next paragraph are paraphrases from Luke
10:25-37.)
What is often forgotten about
the story of the Good Samaritan
is that Jesus is reportedly completely satisfied with this reply
by the lawyer. In effect he tells
him that he is in great shape.
"You know the law, you know
you are not supposed to kill or
steal, and you know that you are
on the side of rectifying injustice.
If you live in accord with this,
you have got everything a person
could ever want, nothing less than
eternal life." Within the context,
then, of this incident, Jesus in no
way questions the Mosaic Covenant or its applicability as a form
of kindness to one's neighbor. "If
you wish to love your neighbor,
do not kill him."
But the lawyer seems to be a
very contemporary figure because
he asks the question that keeps
getting asked over and over again
today: who is my neighbor? Who
are the ones that I am to love by
183

restraining myself against acts of
killing, stealing, and the like?
It is at this point that Jesus
introduces the well-known story
about the Samaritan who while
on the road to Jericho, unlike others who pass by, stops to aid a
person who is half dead, having
been robbed, beaten, and left to
die. There is no suggestion in this
story that one should think in the
least about whether the dying
person qualifies for care. Indeed,
after telling the story, Jesus asks
the lawyer who was the neighbor
to the one who was in need. The
lawyer grasps the point of the
story and says it was the Samaritan as contrasted with those who
had walked by without caring at
all for the wounded person. In
short, neighbors are people who
care. As the story puts it, the Samaritan was the one who showed
mercy.
The Good Samaritan ideal,
therefore, understands mercy in
two ways: as a pledge not to kill
one's neighbor, and as a pledge to
be the kind of person who provides care for those who need it.
There is nothing in the story that
suggests that there is anyone who
is beyond our care or that one can
claim that someone in need does
not qualify for it. And certainly
there is nothing in the story that
suggests that killing is a form of
mercy.
Advocates of beneficent euthanasia would generally agree that
one should not kill innocent people, particularly those who are as
powerless to defend themselves as
the dying and the handicapped,
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and also that people in need
should receive care. They are
skeptical about the kind of care
that can and will be provided to
relieve pain and suffering by
those who reject mercy killing.
Our ethic of benemortasia offers
at least the following kind of care
to patients who are considered to
be imminently dying: (1) relief of
pain; (2) relief of suffering; (3)
respect for patients' rights to refuse treatment; and (4) provision
of health care regardless of ability
to pay.
(1) Relief of Pain
There is widespread agreement
among those who oppose beneficent euthanasia but who believe
in mercy that pain relief should
be made available to patients even
when it means shortening the dying process. This is not considered
killing or assisting in a killing
because the cause of death is the
terminal illness of the patient,
and the shortening of the dying
process has to do wi th a choice
on the part of patients to live
with less pain during their last
days. All of us make choices about
whether or not we will seek pain
relief. While we are not terminally
ill, we also make choices about
the kind of care we do or do not
seek. There is no reason to deny
such freedom to someone who is
dying. Indeed, there is every reason to be especially solicitous of a
person whose days are known to
be numbered. There is no legal or
moral objection to the administration of pain relief provided it
is for that purpose and not for the
purpose of killing someone. This
Linacre Quarterly

means that one does not knowingly give an overdose of pain relief, but rather concentrates on
dosages that are sufficient for relief of pain, knowing that at some
point the final dose will be administered. Official Roman Catholic
hospital regulations in this country explicitly permit hastening
the dying process through the administration of pain relief.
(2) Relief of Suffering
Suffering is not the same as
pain although in instances where
pain is extremely excruciating, it
is virtually impossible to avoid
suffering. We know, for example,
that physicians can relieve suffering in a variety of ways. There is
some evidence that patients who
know they are dying generally
suffer less and are less inclined to
ask for pain relief than those who
do not know that they are dying.
We know also that one of the major sources of suffering of dying
people can come from loneliness
and lack of companionship. Our
ethic of benemortasia would consider it not only merciful but part
of good care in the strictest medical sense to make provision for
companionship, whether wit h
medical , para-medical, or other
kinds of persons brought to the
hospital expressly for this purpose. Churches and other voluntary organizations often assist in
,,' these ".ways ..",Elisabej;h KublerRoss, l(J who is an opponent of
beneficent e u t han a s i a but a
staunch proponent and practitioner of mercy in the form of relief of suffering, has provided one
August, 1975

important model of care for dying
persons.
(3) Patients' Rights to Refuse
Treatment
Dying patients are also living
patients. They retain the same
rights as everyone else voluntarily
to leave the hospital or to refuse
specific kinds of care. Indeed, this
right is legally recognized. No
new law is required to allow patients to exercise their rights. One
of the important good effects of
the whole discusion of euthanasia
is that all of us, including health
professionals, are becoming more
sensitive to this right to refuse
care. Given the concern not to
kill, one would continue to expect
that physicians who hold there is
some hope of saving a life, would
usually presuppose consent of
their patients to strive for their
lives even where such patients
may be expressing a wish to die.
Many desperately sick people
have despaired of life temporarily
but are later grateful to be alive
and well.
Those who are irreversibly comatose or those who as in Kohl's
paradigm have no functioning of
the cerebral cortex, no use of
muscles, etc., pose special difficulties both for an ethic of beneficent euthanasia as well as an
ethic of benemortasia. Weare
dealing in these instances with
'" very tragic cir,c,umstances. N o",decision we make is totally satisfactory from a moral point of
view. From the standpoint of our
ethic of benemortasia, there is a
strong presumption to continue to
185

support the irreversibly comatose
and the severely brain-damaged
until there is no reasonable hope
of sustaining life apart from measures that go far beyond ordinary
care. There comes a point where
the decision to stop useless interventions can be made out of
mercy and also out of the recognition that for the irreversibly comatose, death is inevitable, and
that for the s eve rei y braindamaged child, it will be merciful
to withdraw from more than ordinary care in the face of the next
serious bout of illness where such
episodes will be frequent and
devastating. The difference between beneficent euthanasia and
our ethic of benemortasia is that
whereas the former would deliberately induce death, the latter as a
last resort, after making every effort to save and repair life, mercifully retreats to simple care in
the face of death's inevitability.
(4) Universal Health Care
In order to be merciful as well
as just in the provision of care for
dying and severely handicapped
people, no single person or family
should have to bear alone the burden of extensive medical costs. It
is notorious that poor people are
more often and much sooner let
go as dying persons than those
who have ample financial resources. Those concerned with
mercy should also bear in mind
that the much higher rates of maternal and infant death suffered
by blacks is one of the more subtle, systemic ways in which a society permits euthanasia. It is
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difficult to imagine that one
could call such subtle forms of
euthanasia in any sense merciful
or beneficent. Discussions of beneficent euthanasia should not overlook these injustices to people in
need of care.
So far in discussing our ethic
of benemortasia, we have stressed
the ways in which mercy can be
extended to patients without inducing death. However, the proponents of beneficent euthanasia
would not be completely satisfied
in all cases with the form that
mercy takes in our ethic of benemortasia. Kohl emphasizes a
quick, painless death. Our ethic
of benemortasia emphasizes erring on the side of the protection
of life while still minimizing suffering. In order to understand
this remaining difference between
beneficent euthanasia and our
ethic of benemortasia, it is necessary to see that they differ with
respect to their notions as to what
constitutes human dignity.
Proponents of beneficent euthanasia, including Kohl, tend to
rest their case on the following
kinds of presuppositions:
(1) That the dignity that at-

taches to personhood by
reason of the freedom to
make moral choices demands also the freedom to
take one's own life or to
have it taken when this
freedom is absent or lost;
(2) That there is such a thing
as a life not worth living,
a life which lacks dignity,
whether by reason of disLinacre Quarterly

tress, illness, physical or
mental handicaps, or even
sheer despair for whatever reason;
(3) That what is sacred or supreme in value is the "human dignity" that resides
in man's own rational capacity to choose and control life and death.
Our ethic of benemortasia as
outlined here presupposes the following kinds of presuppositions
about human diginity :
(1) That the dignity that attaches to personhood by
reason of the freedom to
make moral choices includes the freedom of dying people to refuse nonc ura tive , life-prolonging
interventions when one is
dying, but does not extend
to taking one's life or causing death for someone who
is dying be c a use that
would be unjustified killing;
(2) That every life has some
worth;
(3) That notions of dignity are
judged on the basis of
what is right, merciful, and
just, obligations which the
dying and those who care
for the dying share. Less
than perfectly good beings,
human beings, require constraints upon their decisions regarding those who
are dying. No human being or human community
can presume to know who
deserves to live or to die.
August, 1975

From a religious perspective, some would leave that
kind of decision to GOd. 11
There are two very critical differences in these two sets of presuppositions. Whereas in the ethic
of beneficent euthanasia, life of a
certain kind or life having dignity
is what has value, in our ethic of
benemortasia, life as such retains
some value whatever form it
takes. The dying or handicapped
person is always worth caring for.
Another critical difference between the two ethical views we
are comparing is that the notion
of mercy in our ethic of benemortasia is controlled by what is considered right, parlicularly the injunction not to kill on which a
wide moral and social consensus
exists. The notion of mercy in an
ethic of beneficent euthanasia as
depicted by someone like Kohl
and also Joseph Fletcher I 2 is controlled by the conception of human dignity. One of the reasons
that Kohl and Fletcher insist upon inducing death and making it
come quickly is that certain lives
are quite undignified and only become dignified in death. It is for
this reason that someone like
Fletcher can speak of a right to
die.
It is precisely this appeal to
some notion of dignity to justify
killing which evokes "wedge" arguments. As I indicated previously, there are serious and widespread differences among people
as to what constitutes human dignity. If who shall live and who
shall die is made contingent upon
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these widely divergent views of
human dignity, moral and legal
policies that justify mercy killing
can in principle justify a very narrow and/ or a very wide range of
instances in which it will be
claimed we as a society are obligated to kill someone.
The debate concerning what
constitutes human dignity is not
one that can be easily resolved.
There are deep philosophical and
religious differences that divide
people here. The injunction not
to kill is not divisive in this way.
A great deal of the emotion generated by the debate over euthanasia finds its source precisely in
the understandable and deep uneasiness of a great number of individuals when they are asked to
move away from a stringent notion
of refraining from acts of killing
regarding which there is widespread agreement, and to make
judgments about who shall live
and who shall die on the basis of
conceptions of human dignity regarding which there are deep religious, ethnic, philosophical, and
other differences. To argue for
beneficent euthanasia is to invite
and stir up religious controversy
and to threaten human trust and
cooperation. To argue for the
Good Samaritan ideal is to affirm
the very basis of human community, namely, mercy that re, frains"from killing and that' extends care to ·those who need it.
The ethic of the good death
(benemortasia) is also the ethic
of the good life.
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